Benchmarking Brexit: How the British Decision to Leave Shapes EU Public Opinion by De Vries, CE
  
 
 
To appear in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 2017: 
Early View URL: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.12579/full 
 
 
 
Benchmarking Brexit: 
How the British Decision to Leave 
Shapes EU Public Opinion  
 
 
Catherine E. De Vries 
Department of Government 
University of Essex 
Wivenhoe Park 
CO4 3SQ Colchester 
United Kingdom 
catherine.devries@essex.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 2 
 
The British are of course testing us, we all know that.  
They are testing how united Europe actually is.  
So what is important is that Europe stays together.  
 
Vice-President of the European People’s Party,  
David McAllister, 19 November 20161 
 
Benchmarking Brexit: 
How the British Decision to Leave Shapes EU Public Opinion*  
 
 
CATHERINE E. DE VRIES 
University of Essex  
 
 
 
Introduction 
On 23 June 2016, by a small majority the British population voted to leave the 
European Union (EU). The British decision to leave shocked the political 
establishment in London, Brussels and beyond. Immediately after the vote, the 
pound fell sharply as uncertainty among investors about Britain’s economic future 
started to grow. Politically, the situation was not much different. Not only did Prime 
Minister David Cameron resign, but the referendum result unmasked deep divisions 
between different regions and amongst the constituent components of the United 
Kingdom as well as within the two major political forces in Westminster, the 
Conservative and Labour parties. New Prime Minister Theresa May was confronted 
                                                          
1
 The Guardian, 19 November 2016. 
* I would like to thank the editors of the JCMS Annual Review, especially Tim 
Haughton, for excellent comments on a draft of this paper as well as Sara Hobolt, 
Hector Solaz, Christina Schneider and Stefanie Walter for discussions about the 
arguments presented here more generally. 
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with the daunting task of negotiating British withdrawal from the EU whilst keeping 
her party and country together at a time when the exact economic costs of Brexit are 
still highly uncertain. While the British economy weathered the vote and its 
immediate aftermath better than expected, long-term assessments of a post-Brexit 
British economy are less rosy.2 This might be at least in part the result of the Brittish 
government’s decision to delay the triggering of Article 50. The market response 
following the invoking of the article seems to suggest as such.  
 
Although the reasons behind Britain’s decision to quit the EU have received ample 
scholarly attention already (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Clarke et al., 
2017), the consequences of the vote for public support for the EU and the future of 
the European project have received less attention in the scholarly debate. Speculation 
among politicians and pundits has moved in two directions. Some suggest that the 
Brexit vote might turn out to be a unifying moment for Europe. The political 
paralysis that emerged from the fundamentally different viewpoints in the European 
bloc about how to tackle the eurozone and refugee crises could give away to a more 
coordinated and European approach. Comments by Xavier Bettel, the prime minister 
of Luxembourg, at the intergovernmental conference held in Brussels following the 
result of the British referendum reflected this view: ‘We have more need than ever 
for a united Union rather than a disunited Kingdom.’3 Yet, again others suggest that 
the Brexit vote might lead to the crumbling of Jean Monnet’s dream of building a 
Union among people rather than states. Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs like 
Geert Wilders or Marine Le Pen, for example, hailed the outcome of the British 
referendum as the beginning of the end of the EU, and claimed that France and the 
Netherlands would follow suit.4 Although the initiation of exit referendums in other 
                                                          
2 See, for example, the findings of a survey conducted among economists about the 
long term costs of Brexit in The Financial Times, 7 January 2017. 
3 See The Financial Times, 29 June 2016.  
4 For a discussion see The Guardian, 12 November 2016. 
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member states is complicated due to the largely pro-EU parliamentary majorities or 
constitutional hurdles, the Brexit vote might not bring the people of Europe together, 
but drive them further apart. Which view will turn out to be the right one, is difficult 
to determine without a crystal ball, but by looking at some recent survey data this 
contribution will attempt to shed some light on the consequences of the 23 June 
referendum result on public opinion in the rest of the EU.   
 
By combining novel survey data with a survey experiment, this contribution 
examines the possible ramifications of the Brexit vote for public support for EU 
membership and further integrative steps in Europe. In order to explore the 
consequences of the British decision to leave the EU, this study relies on data from 
two surveys that I have designed together with Isabell Hoffmann on behalf of the 
Bertelsmann Foundation and which were conducted just before and after the Brexit 
vote in April and August 2016. Moreover, I also present evidence from a survey 
experiment that was embedded in the August 2016 wave of the survey (De Vries and 
Hoffmann, 2016a, 2016b). This contribution argues that the Brexit vote will likely be 
very important for the development of public opinion towards the EU because it sets 
a precedent for leaving. Based on the benchmark theory of public opinion towards 
the EU that I have developed more extensively elsewhere (De Vries, 2017), I suggest 
that support for the EU essentially boils down to a comparison between the benefits 
of the current status quo of membership and those of an alternative state, namely 
one’s country being outside the EU. The decision of the British to leave the EU 
provides people with valuable information about the possible economic and political 
costs and benefits associated with the alternative state.  
 
This contribution reports four findings. First, it documents that support for EU 
membership was higher immediately after the Brexit vote than before. Although I 
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cannot make causal claims about a ‘Brexit effect’ per se as the data is not based on a 
panel, these findings seem to suggest that as the uncertainty of leaving manifested 
itself, the status quo of membership started to look more favourable. Second, this 
interpretation is strengthened further by the finding that an increase in support for 
EU membership after Brexit is especially pronounced among those who think that 
the consequences of Brexit will be bad for the United Kingdom. Third, in order to 
test my argument in a more causal way, I present evidence from a survey 
experiment that suggests that when people receive information that reflects badly on 
their country, and thus makes the alternative state to EU membership look less 
desirable, support for European integration increases compared to those in the 
control group. Finally, I suggest that Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs like Marine 
Le Pen in France or Beppe Grillo in Italy are likely to be crucially important in 
framing what Brexit might mean for other member states.  
 
These findings are important not only for the way we understand public opinion 
towards the EU and people’s behaviour in EU referendums post-Brexit, but also 
inform the on-going Brexit negotiations and possible other exit negotiations in the 
future. The findings presented here suggest that it will be extremely important for 
EU officials and the national governments of the remaining member states to make 
sure that the British example is not perceived as setting a positive precedent for 
leaving. If so, the Brexit vote might spark off claims for exit referendums in other 
member states. This contribution is structured as follows. In a first step, I 
conceptualize the role that Brexit might play in the development of public opinion 
towards the EU in the future based on the benchmark theory and highlight some 
core expectations. In a second step, I outline the data and experimental design as 
well as discuss the empirical findings. Third, I highlight the role that Eurosceptic 
political entrepreneurs might play in framing Brexit. In a final step, I conclude and 
outline the implications of my findings. 
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I. Public Opinion towards the EU: Understanding the Role of Brexit 
 
Over the last few decades an extensive literature has developed that examines the 
determinants of public opinion towards the EU (for an overview see Hobolt and De 
Vries, 2016). Three key approaches stand out: economic interest, national identity, 
and party or media elite cues (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Work on economic interest 
stresses that market integration favors citizens with higher levels of human capital, 
such as education and occupational skills, and income. As a result, highly skilled 
workers and/or high-income earners are expected to be more supportive of 
European integration (Gabel, 1998). Studies on identity highlight that the European 
project is not only about market integration, but has also created a sense of European 
political identity and mutual obligation. By consequence, people’s strong and 
exclusive attachments to their nation as well as negative perceptions of people from 
other cultures weakens their support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2009; 
McLaren, 2002, Kuhn, 2015). A third and final explanation highlights the importance 
of party and media cues. Most Europeans have few direct experiences with the EU 
and their detailed knowledge of the EU’s inner workings is quite limited as a result. 
As a result, they rely on party and media 'cues' to overcome their information 
shortfalls (Ray, 2003; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Schuck and de Vreese, 
2006; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Hellström, 2008). While government parties have been 
shown to on average provide positive cues about Europe, opposition parties 
especially on the extreme left and right end of the political spectrum rally 
Eurosceptic sentiment (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). 
 
While these approaches have greatly contributed to our understanding of public 
support and scepticism towards the EU, they provide us with little guidance about 
how the outcome of the Brexit vote might affect public support for Europe. As I have 
argued elsewhere (De Vries, 2017), public opinion towards the EU is best understood 
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with reference to benchmarks. The benchmark theory suggests that people’s 
attitudes towards Europe are ultimately rooted in a comparison, namely a 
comparison between the benefits of the current status quo of membership with those 
associated with an alternative state of one’s country being outside the EU. People are 
only willing to take the risk of voting for their country to leave the EU or casting a 
ballot for a party that advocates secession when they think that the alternative to 
membership is better. The alternative state of one’s country being outside the EU is 
largely unknown so people will rely on benchmarks to compensate for these 
informational shortfalls. These include current national economic performance and 
quality of government, but also precedents of other countries leaving . While people 
could in principle also benchmark the alternative state by judging how well 
countries like Norway or Switzerland fare that have never joined the EU, the 
transaction costs associated with leaving are fundamentally different. The extent to 
which people support the status quo of membership thus crucially depends on their 
beliefs about how well their country would do outside the European bloc and the 
information they use to form these beliefs.  
 
One can think about this in the following way. Every individual (or group of 
individuals) derives some benefits from their country through the provision of 
public goods and services, such as roads, public television, national defence, etc. To 
be delivered efficiently some public goods and service require international 
cooperation such as trade.  Or certain problems transcend and require international 
solutions, such as the climate change (Alesina et al., 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
Moreover, being part of the EU institutional architecture may deliver unique goods 
and services for individuals that the national systems in which they reside by 
themselves could not. These benefits originating from the advantages of scale, 
however, can be perceived to come at a cost. Single market access in the EU, for 
example, currently also implies the acceptance of the free movement of people. This 
has already proven an important touchstone of dissent within electoral campaigns in 
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some member states and was a central issue in the Brexit campaign (Clarke et al., 
2017, see also Kriesi et al., 2008). Other perceived costs that have been highlighted by 
Eurosceptic pundits are that countries have to accept the jurisdiction of the European 
Court, or engage in some forms of financial guarantees, transfer payments or debt 
relief efforts, for example, through membership in the Eurozone (De Vries, 2017). 
 
The notion introduced by the benchmark theory, that the viability of the alternative 
state to membership matters for people’s support for the EU, builds on existing work 
highlighting the importance of national context. In its simplest version, the argument 
is that national performance affects people’s support for integration. Sánchez-
Cuenca (2000), for example, argues that those citizens who are dissatisfied with the 
performance at the national level mainly because of corruption are more willing to 
transfer sovereignty to the EU level. Moreover, Rohrschneider (2002) shows that 
citizens who perceive their national democratic institutions to be working well, 
display lower levels of EU support because they view the EU to be democratically 
deficient. Furthermore, Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) highlight that this 
relationship is conditional upon the overall level of economic prosperity in a 
country. Citizens in less affluent nations evaluate the EU mainly on the basis of 
economic performance, while in more affluent nations publics rely mostly on 
political criteria, such as the functioning of their national democracies. What is 
different in the benchmark approach is that rather than viewing national context as 
influencing public opinion in a one-directional way flowing from national to 
European evaluations, I suggests that the flow can be two-directional or that events 
in one national context, like the Brexit vote, can impact people’s comparisons of the 
benefits of the status quo of membership as well as the alternative state in another 
national context (see also, for example, the benchmark approach in economic voting 
by Kayser and Peress (2012)).  
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When we understand support and scepticism as a comparison between the benefits 
of the current status quo of membership and those associated with an alternative 
state, the Brexit vote and its immediate aftermath become crucially important. The 
benefits of the alternative state of one’s country being outside the EU are unknown 
and uncertain. They imply a counterfactual, namely how would my country do were 
it not a member of the EU? Counterfactuals involve risk. Research suggests that due 
to imperfect information about what the future may bring, people will most likely 
favour existing benefits that are known to them over uncertain future ones (see 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 for example). All else being equal, people will thus prefer 
the status quo. The immediate economic and political effects of the Brexit vote 
provide people with a crucial piece of information, namely what the costs or benefits 
of leaving could be. Directly after the vote, some of the possible political and 
economic costs manifested themselves. The result, for example, sent a shock wave 
through the stock and currency markets. Over £100 billion was wiped of the London 
Stock Exchange, the British pound and the 10-year government bond yield reached 
record lows, and the UK was stripped of its triple-A rating. In late 2016 and early 
2017, many of the stock market losses were recovered.Yet, as the British government 
negotiations its withdrawl from the EU economic uncertainty will be abound.5  
Political uncertainty was also considerable thanks initially to Cameron’s resignation, 
but also due to debates about the nature of the exit and the tensions between the 
constituent parts of the United Kingdom. The new Prime Minister Theresa May took 
a hard line by stating that Brexit meant Brexit even if that meant leaving the Single 
Market.6 In effect, her mantra ‘Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a success 
of it’ could be seen as a rather successful holding strategy to contain the debate 
                                                          
5 For a discussion see The Economist, 16 July 2016 [as you are referring to uncertainty 
abounding still now i.e. many months after the referendum I’m not sure this is the 
best source to use  
6
 For a discussion see The Atlantic, 17 January 2017. 
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about what it all would mean in practice.7 The verdict on the exact costs of Brexit 
will only be known in the long-run, but the process of withdrawal from the EU will 
be associated with considerable political and economic uncertainty. It is that very 
uncertainty which feeds into the calculations in the benchmark model.   
 
Based on my benchmark theory of public opinion towards the EU, I would expect 
support for the EU to increase when the benefits of alternative state look less 
favourable. When the alternative state of one’s country being outside the EU looks 
less viable, support for the status quo of membership or even further integrative 
steps in Europe should rise as a result. The economic and political uncertainty 
immediately after the Brexit vote provides people with more information about the 
possible counterfactual, namely how well one’s country would do outside the EU. 
Against this backdrop, I expect that immediately following the Brexit vote support 
for the EU should be higher in the remaining 27 member states. Moreover, it should 
be higher among those who think that the consequences of Brexit for Britain will be 
bad on average.  
 
II. Empirical Results 
I examine the extent to which the economic and political uncertainty following the 
Brexit vote affects public opinion towards the EU by relying on two waves of 
surveys that I designed together with Isabell Hoffmann on behalf of the Bertelsmann 
Foundation (De Vries and Hoffmann, 2016a, 2016b). EUpinions is a bi-annual survey 
that aims to examine the public mood towards the EU and national political systems 
in the EU as whole as well as in the six largest member states in terms of population 
(France, Great Britain8, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain). In 2016 two waves of the 
                                                          
7 I thank Tim Haughton for pointing this out. 
8
 Note that in the remaining parts of the contribution, I will refer to Great Britain 
rather than the United Kingdom. This is because the public opinion data sources that 
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EUpinons survey were conducted, one before the Brexit vote in April and one after 
in August. In both waves we asked respondents how they would vote if a 
membership referendum were held today. Would they vote to ‘remain’ or to ‘leave’ 
the EU? Given that I am interested here in support for remaining in the EU pre- and 
post-Brexit in the EU-27 figure 1 displays the percentage of those intending to vote 
remain in the EU excluding Great Britain plus percentages in the five largest 
member states, namely France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, where we 
conducted more in-depth studies. Note that I am not able to causally identify a 
Brexit effect as the surveys are not based on a panel where the same group of people 
get asked the question twice. Thus there is no way of ruling out that factors other 
than Brexit might have played a role. That said, the data is unique in the sense that I 
am able to gauge membership support in hypothetical membership referenda across 
the EU as a whole and within selected member states.  
 
Figure 1 shows that overall support for one’s country to remain in the EU is slightly 
higher in August compared to April of 2016. The increase is statistically significant 
for the EU-27 as well as Germany and Poland. The biggest jump in support for 
remaining in the EU is recorded in Germany with eight per cent. Interestingly, figure 
1 shows that support for remaining in the EU is overall quite high, seventy per cent 
or higher in the EU-27, Germany, Poland and Spain. That said, it is much lower in 
France and Italy. In fact, in Italy support for remaining inside the EU hovers between 
the 50 and 55 per cent mark. This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the EU, and 
especially the euro, is a very divisive issue in Italian politics thanks in no small part 
to the critiques voiced by the Five Star Movement against what they call an 
inefficient European bureaucracy and heartless austerity. Although a referendum on 
the EU or euro membership is unlikely given the Italian constitutional arrangements, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
I use do not always include Northern Ireland. In order to be consistent, I rely on data 
from Great Britain only. 
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if it were called, these findings suggest that the outcome of such a vote would be 
highly uncertain.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparing support for remaining in the EU before and after Brexit 
 
Notes: the dots represent the percentage of people who would vote for their country to remain in the 
EU if a membership referendum were held today in the April and August waves of the EUpinions 
survey with 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
 
 
The findings presented in figure 1 provide some support for the idea that the 
uncertainty following Brexit might have lowered people’s perceptions of how viable 
it would be for their country to be outside the EU and therefore increased support 
for membership. Figure 2 provides further support for this interpretation. It plots the 
support for one’s country to remain in the EU for two sets of people, those who think 
Brexit will have bad consequences for Britain and those who think that the 
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consequences will be good. While support for remaining in the EU is close to 70 per 
cent for those who think that Brexit will have bad consequences for Britain, it is only 
38 per cent for those who think the consequences will be good.  
 
 
Figure 2: Comparing support for remaining in the EU of those who think 
consequences of Brexit will be good or bad for Britain, EU-27 
 
 
Notes: the bars represent the percentage who would vote for their country to remain in the EU if a 
membership referendum were held today of those who think that the consequences of Brexit will be 
bad or good for Britain respectively based on the August wave of the EUpinions survey. The 
difference in remain support between both groups are statistically significant at a p<.05 level (two-
tailed).  
 
 
Figure 3 displays the same information but now split by the five largest EU member 
states. The figure shows the same pattern as in the EU-27 with remain support being 
highest among those who think that the consequences of Brexit will be bad. The 
differences are most pronounced in Italy and Spain. They are still considerable and 
 14 
 
statistically significant in France, Germany and Poland, but the differences here are 
overall somewhat smaller.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparing support for remaining in the EU of those who think 
consequences of Brexit will be good or bad for Britain 
 
 
Notes: the bars represent the percentage who would vote for their country to remain in the EU if a 
membership referendum were held today of those who think that the consequences of Brexit will be 
bad or good for Britain respectively based on the August wave of the EUpinions survey. The crosses 
indicate that the difference in remain support between both groups are statistically significant at a 
p<.05 level (two-tailed).  
 
 
Do these effects persist in a multivariate analysis when I control for a host of other 
variables like gender, education, age, residency, unemployment and subjective class 
perception as well as people’s views about the politicians and number of foreigners 
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in their country.9 These controls at least in part tap into the economic interest, 
national identity and cues explanations outlined earlier. Figure 4 provides this 
information. It displays the coefficients of a linear probability model where vote 
intention in a hypothetical EU membership referendum is the dependent variable. 
All variables are dummy variables coded between 0 minimum value and 1 
maximum value to ease comparison. In order for an effect to be statistically 
significant, the coefficient represented by the grey dot and the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals represented by the grey line should not fall on or cross the black solid line 
at the zero point on the x-axis. 
 
Figure 4: Predicting Support for Remaining in the EU  
 
 
Notes: the dots represent the coefficients of linear probability model where vote intention in a 
hypothetical EU membership referendum is the dependent variable.. The lines represent the 95 per 
cent confidence intervals. Country dummies were included in the analysis but are not shown here. 
The data is based on the August wave of the EUpinions survey. 
                                                          
9
 Specifically, I use the questions ‘What is your view on the competence of politicians 
in your country? (‘not at all competent’ or ‘overall competent’) and ‘What is your 
view on the number of foreigners in your country? (‘about right’ or ‘ too many’). 
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Figure 4 suggests that if people think that the consequences of Brexit will be bad for 
Britain the likelihood of voting for remaining inside the EU increases substantially. 
This effect remains statistically and substantially significant even if we control for a 
host of other factors such as skills levels, age or people’s views about the politicians 
or number of foreigners in their country. In fact, the effect of people’s expectations 
about the consequences of Brexit is larger than any other factor included in the 
model. When it comes to the controls, we find that as people become more 
suspicious of the number of foreigners or the politicians in their country the 
likelihood of voting to remain in the EU decreases, while having a university 
education, being female or middle class increases it. Finally, being older, 
unemployed or living in a more rural area decreases the support for one’s country to 
remain in the EU. Interestingly, the factors that decrease or increase people’s 
likelihood to vote for their country to remain in the EU within the 27 member states 
are similar than those reported for voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum 
(Hobolt, 2016). 
 
Although the results presented thus far seem to suggest that the Brexit vote and the 
political and economic uncertainty surrounding the decision of the British people to 
leave the EU might have sparked off more support for the EU in the remaining 27 
member states, they also raise questions about causality. The descriptive statistics 
presented in figures 1 through 3 are interesting but do not allow us to rule out 
possible other factors that changed between April and August 2016.  Moreover, the 
multivariate analysis presented in figure 4 showing the effect of people’s views 
about the possible consequences of Brexit for their likelihood to vote to remain in or 
leave the EU in membership referendum might suffer from endogeneity. Do people 
view the consequences of Brexit to be bad because they support the EU or the 
reverse? In order to deal with these concerns and tackle the issue of causality more 
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directly, I also embedded an experiment in the August wave of EUpinions in 2016. 
The experiment was run in nine countries: Austria, France, Great Britain, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. 
 
The survey experiment seeks to capture the effect of negative information about the 
viability of an alternative to EU membership on support for European integration. 
The experiment consisted of one treatment and one control group. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to either the control or treatment group. The control group 
received no information, while the treatment group received a vignette stating that 
‘According to international organizations, corruption in [COUNTRY] seems to be on 
the rise in recent years.’ Both the control and treatment were then asked about their 
national and European regime evaluations. I expect people’s EU evaluations to 
increase when they are exposed to information about an increase in corruption at the 
national level. Respondents were also asked about the importance of corruption for 
their voting decision. The importance of corruption question was introduced as a 
check to establish if the experimental treatment indeed raised the importance of 
corruption in people’s minds. It constitutes a so-called manipulation check. The 
importance of corruption was captured by the following survey item: ‘How 
important is corruption to you as a factor in deciding who to vote for?’ Answers 
range from 0) ‘not important at all’ to 10) ‘very important’. In order to make sure that 
respondents responded to the corruption vignette in the way I would expect and 
attach importance to it, I examined if corruption is more important in deciding 
which party to vote for among people assigned to the treatment group. It was. The 
treatment raised the importance of corruption in people’s minds by .67, two-thirds of 
a point on an 11-point scale, and this effect was statistically significant. 
 
After having established that the experimental vignette worked, I examine the effect 
of being exposed to the corruption vignette on people’s support for more or less 
political and economic integration in Europe. People could answer that they wished 
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to see (1) less political and economic integration, (2) the same political and economic 
integration, or (3) more political and economic integration. In table 1 I show the 
effect of the corruption vignette on support for European integration using both a 
linear probability model as well as an ordered logit model. The latter model is more 
sensitive to the ranking between the three categories. Table 1 shows that no matter 
the model estimated, being exposed to the corruption vignette increases people’s 
support for European integration. This result supports the benchmark theory of 
public opinion towards the EU and suggests that providing people with negative 
information about their country increases people’s evaluations of the benefits of 
European integration. When the alternative state looks less viable, because of 
negative information about one’s national political system operates, support for the 
EU increases as a result.  
 
Table 1: The effect of corruption vignette on support for European integration  
 DV: Support for European Integration 
 OLS Ordered Logit 
Corruption Vignette 
 
.04* 
(.02) 
.09* 
(.05) 
Constant 
Cut1/Cut2 
1.89* 
(.04) 
-.18/.66 
(.10)/(.10) 
Individual Level 
Covariates 
➼ ➼ 
Country  
Dummies 
➼ ➼ 
 
R2/ Wald Chi2 
 
.09 
 
508* 
N 11,185 11,185 
Note: table entries are OLS or ordered logit regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at p≤.05 (one-tailed). 
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III. Role of Eurosceptic Political Entrepreneurs 
 
Taken together, the findings presented so far suggest that the outcome of the Brexit 
vote and the political and economic uncertainty following provided a powerful 
signal for people in the remaining 27 member states about the potential costs and 
benefits of exit. The decision of the British to leave the EU provides people with 
more information about the risks associated with leaving. The data presented here 
are from August 2016 and suggest that Brexit largely set a negative precedent for 
leaving. Yet, for how long will this be the case? At the time of writing, many 
institutions, like the Bank of England or the International Monetary Fund, have 
upgraded their economic outlook on Britain and the economic future might look 
much better than anticipated.10 If these developments persist, the British precedent 
could also spark off demands for exit. Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs are likely 
to play a crucial role in this respect. When it comes to Eurosceptic political parties 
existing work suggests that they mainly come in two varieties: hard and soft 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008; Treib, 2014). Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) use the 
term soft euroscepticism to signify political parties that oppose certain policies or 
institutional aspects at the European level, but do not oppose the entire project as 
such. Hard euroscepticism is a label for parties that strongly oppose the EU. These 
parties reject the idea of European integration and campaign for their countries to 
leave. Examples of soft Eurosceptic parties are Podemos in Spain or the Linke in 
Germany for example, while Front National in France or the Partij van de Vrijheid in 
the Netherlands fall in the hard Eurosceptic category. Party leaders of hard 
Eurosceptic parties like Marine Le Pen or Geert Wilders celebrated the Brexit as a 
victory and called for exit referendums in their own countries. Marine Le Pen 
tweeted immediately after the vote that Brexit was a ‘[v]ictory for freedom! As I have 
been asking for years, we must now have the same referendum in France and EU 
                                                          
10 See The Guardian, 11 January 2017 and 4 October 2017. 
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countries’.11 Geert Wilders added: ‘Hurrah for the British! Now it is our turn. Time 
for a Dutch referendum’.12 
 
Figure 5 below shows people’s expectations about the consequences of Brexit for 
Britain split by party supporters in the five largest EU member states in terms of 
population for which we carried out more in-depth surveys. People were asked what 
they think the consequences for Brexit for Britain and could choose between three 
answer categories: 1) I think the consequences will be good, 2) I think the 
consequences will be bad, or 3) I am unsure what the consequences will be. The 
figure shows that party supporters of hard Eurosceptic parties on the right, the 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Front National (FN), Lega Nord (LN), Prawo I 
Spawiedliwość (PiS), as well as on the left Front de Gauche (Gauche) and Movimente 
Cinque Stelle (MVCS) (although the latter party is difficult to place on a left-right 
scale) are much more likely to be either unsure about or much less likely to think 
that the consequences of Brexit will be bad for Britain compared to supporters of the 
other parties in the system. Hence, already in August 2016 when the economic and 
political uncertainty made the outlook of Brexit look pretty negative, supporters of 
hard Eurosceptic parties were already less pessimistic or generally unsure about 
what the consequences of Brexit would be for Britain. Given that since then the 
economic forecasts for Britain by the Bank of England or International Monetary 
Fund turned out to be better than expected, hard Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs 
might try to use the example of Brexit to rally support for a euro or EU membership 
referendum in their own countries. Although constitutional rules and pro-EU 
mainstream party majorities make referendums less likely, if they were to take place 
                                                          
11 See https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/746209726673760262  (accessed 16 
November 2016). 
12 See https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/746199016128421889 (accessed 16 
November 2016). 
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a sizable segment of the population might be swayed by arguments that their 
country would be better outside the EU (or Eurozone). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparing support for remaining in the EU of those who think 
consequences of Brexit will be good or bad for Britain, by party identifiers in five 
countries 
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Notes: the bars represent the percentage who would vote for their country to remain in the EU if a membership referendum were held today of those who 
think that the consequences of Brexit will be bad or good for Britain respectively based on the August wave of the EUpinions survey split by party 
supporters. The party acronyms stand for: CDU-CSU-Christlich Demokratische Union-Christlich-Soziale Union, SPD-Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, Bd90/G-Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Linke-Die Linke, FDP-Freie Demokratische Partei, AfD-Alternative für Deutschland;Rep- Les Républicains, 
PS –Parti Socialiste, FN –Front National, Gauche-Parti de Gauche, MoDem-Mouvement démocrate; PD-Partido Democratico, MVCS- Movimento 5 Stelle, LN-
Lega Nord, FI-Forza Italia; PiS-Prawo I Spawiedliwość, PO-Platforma Obywatelska, K’15-Kukiz’15, .Nowo-.Modern; PP - Partido Popular, PSOE – Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, C’s –Cuidadanos. 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Although prior to the Brexit referendum experts had already pointed out that the 
outcomes of EU referendums are notoriously hard to predict, the outcome of the 
vote was nonetheless a shock for many. The polls leading up to the referendum 
predicted a small lead for the Remain side campaigning for Britain to stay in the EU. 
As the results of the referendum started pouring in from around the country, a 
different picture started to emerge. The polls got it wrong. 51.9 per cent of the British 
people voted for their country to leave. The outcome of the vote is of historical 
importance. One of the six largest members of the EU in terms of population turned 
their back on Europe. The vote demonstrated that exit is a possibility. This 
contribution suggests that by setting a precedent for exit, the Brexit vote is likely to 
cast a long shadow on public opinion towards the EU in the remaining 27 member 
states. Based on my benchmark theory, I have conceived public opinion towards the 
EU as the result of a comparison, namely a comparison between the benefits of the 
status quo of membership and the alternative state, one’s country being outside. The 
alternative state of one’s country being outside the EU is largely unknown so people 
will rely on benchmarks to compensate for these informational shortfalls. The 
precedent of another country leaving is likely to be an important benchmark. (De 
Vries 2017). It provides people with a valuable source of information that allows 
them to inform their beliefs about how well their country would do outside the EU. 
 
This study documents four findings. First, it demonstrated that support for EU 
membership was higher immediately after the outcome of the Brexit vote compared 
to before it. Although I do not have panel data and therefore cannot rule out that 
other factors than Brexit were important in this change, these findings do support 
the idea that the political and economic uncertainty immediately following the vote, 
made the status quo of membership looks more favourable and the prospect of 
leaving less so. Second, the findings suggested that an increase in support for EU 
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membership after Brexit is especially pronounced among those who think that the 
consequences of Brexit will be bad for the United Kingdom. This fits the 
interpretation that when the Brexit is perceived as setting a bad precedent because of 
the negative political and economic consequences, support for remaining in the EU 
should increase in the other member states. Thinking that the consequences of Brexit 
will be bad is related to prior levels of support for integration, so in order to test my 
argument in a more causal way, I present evidence from a survey experiment. The 
experimental evidence showed that when people receive information that reflects 
badly on their country, and thus makes the alternative state look less favorable, 
support for European integration is higher compared to those in the control 
condition. This finding suggests that how people view Brexit and what the Brexit 
experience tells them about the prospects of their own country outside the EU will 
be of crucial importance for shaping people’s support for the EU in the future. 
Arguably, Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs that vocalize demands for exit will be 
crucially important in framing what Brexit means in popular debate. Indeed, I find 
that supporters of hard Eurosceptic parties are much less likely to view the 
consequences of Brexit as bad for Britain or are much more unsure about what the 
consequences will be compared to supporters of more pro-EU parties.  
 
Why do these findings matter? First, they inform current debates about public 
opinion towards the EU. Public opinion towards the EU has largely been understood 
as a reflection of developments at the EU level. People stand to gain and lose from 
integration economically or in terms of their sense of belonging and will therefore 
support or be sceptical about the European project. This contribution suggests 
although these factors are undoubtedly important, the degree to which people 
perceive that their country would survive or even thrive outside the EU is key, even 
when they themselves might stand to gain for market and political integration in 
Europe. If people think that the benefits of the alternative state exceed those of EU 
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membership, support for integration may be low regardless of the overall positive 
benefits of integration for themselves or their country.  
 
Second, the findings presented here inform the scholarly debate about which issues 
determine people’s choices in EU referendums. This debate has pitted the view that 
people use EU referendums as means to signal their evaluations of national 
government or elites more generally (Franklin et al., 1994), against the idea that 
people’s attitudes towards European integration matter (Garry et al., 2005; Suine and 
Svensson, 1993). This study suggests that understanding decision making in EU 
referendums as either EU related (EU issue voting) or not (second order voting) 
might not be that helpful. Understanding people’s support for the EU as a 
comparison between the status quo of membership and alternative state suggests 
that by definition evaluations about both how the EU and one’s own country, and 
even other countries are doing, will matter.  
 
Finally, the results presented here also inform developments in EU politics now and 
in the future. They suggest that it will be crucially important for the EU and the 
national governments of the remaining 27 member states to make sure that the 
British example does not set a positive precedent. When the economic and political 
fallout turns out to be comparatively mild, and the British government is able to 
negotiate a relatively good deal while at the same time limiting immigration, this 
might have grave consequences for the support for leaving the EU in other countries. 
In countries with vocal Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs, like France or Italy for 
example, having a positive example of how exit can combine trade with immigration 
controls might turn out to be a gamble that people might be willing to take. In these 
countries leaving the EU will mean leaving the Euro as well which makes the 
transaction costs so much higher, yet how high is the question? Moreover, in most of 
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the remaining EU member states mainstream parliamentary majorities that are pro-
EU or constitutional hurdles make exit referendums rather unlikely, but that said if a 
referendum were to take place, the findings presented here would suggest that the 
outcome would be highly uncertain.  
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